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ABSTRACT 
Nowadays philosophers of perception often dismiss sense-data theory as 
something extravagant, without further qualifi cations or detailed arguments, 
despite its historical importance and current infl uence. In this paper I will 
properly reassess its basic commitments and consequences in light of new 
developments in the philosophies of mind and perception. I will examine in 
detail the nature of sense-data and I will point out that sense-data theory not 
only carries the unacceptable ontological and epistemological consequences 
frequently identifi ed, but that it also cannot be conclusively established or 
refuted solely on the basis of introspective evidence as many authors have 
previously suggested.
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RESUMEN 
En la actualidad la teoría de los datos sensoriales es frecuentemente 
descartada por los fi lósofos de la percepción como algo extravagante 
sin otorgar califi caciones adicionales o argumentos detallados, pese a su 
importancia histórica y a la infl uencia que aún tiene. En este artículo pretendo 
reevaluar adecuadamente sus compromisos básicos y consecuencias a la 
luz de nuevos desarrollos en las fi losofías de la mente y la percepción. 
Examinaré con detalle la naturaleza de los datos sensoriales y señalaré que 
esta teoría no solo conlleva las inaceptables consecuencias ontológicas y 
epistemológicas que se identifi can con frecuencia, sino también que esta 
no puede ser establecida o refutada conclusivamente solo en base a nuestra 
evidencia introspectiva como muchos autores han sugerido.
Palabras Clave: Datos sensoriales, mundo externo, 
subjetivismo, fi sicalismo, introspección.
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The reality of appearances 
Challenging our naïve assumptions regarding visual perception2 some 
philosophers think that there is something common to perceptual and non-
perceptual visual experiences; namely that during every visual episode 
(veridical, illusory or simply hallucinatory) we are always immediately aware 
of something other than mind-independent physical objects and properties. In 
order to establish this controversial conclusion philosophers often formulate 
sophisticated arguments based on the possibility of perceptual error, such 
as the well-known argument from illusion:
(a) In perception sometimes real physical objects appear different from 
how they actually are; they appear to possess sensory qualities that they do 
not actually possess. 
(b) When it appears to a subject that something possesses a sensory 
quality F, then there is something possessing that quality F.
(c) If something G has a sensory quality that something O lacks, then 
G and O are not identical.
(d) Since by hypothesis, in these cases the real physical object does not 
possess the sensory quality F, then it follows that the subject is either not 
aware of the real physical object at all or is at least not aware of it directly.
(e) There is introspective phenomenological continuity between those 
cases in which the real physical objects appear other than how they actually 
are and those in which they appear as they are.
(f) If there is introspective phenomenological continuity, then the 
same account of perception should be applicable to all cases of perceptual 
awareness.
(g) In all cases of perception the subject is immediately aware 
of something different from the real physical objects which are being 
purportedly perceived.
2 There are certain commonsensical assumptions that we usually grant about visual 
perception, the nature of visual experiences and the way we acquire knowledge about the 
external environment using our senses. These assumptions are generally said to be naïve in the 
sense that they clearly indicate or capture a set of pre-theoretical intuitions that most subjects 
uncritically endorse when they try to characterize how one is to perceive or to undergo a 
perceptual experience. These considerations are pre-theoretical or commonsensical because 
they aim to express what is naturally compelling, independently of any sophisticated scientifi c 
or philosophical story about perception in general or about the nature of our perceptual 
episodes in particular. I think that it is uncontroversial to say that from a pre-theoretical naïve 
standpoint we assume that during successful episodes of veridical perception the immediate 
objects of perception are mind-independent physical objects and properties that continue to 
exist while not perceived, such as black tables, brown chairs and straight sticks of wood.  
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(h) The naïve pre-theoretical thesis that in perception we are directly/
immediately aware of mind-independent physical objects is false.
The conclusion of the argument from illusion is mainly grounded 
introspectively, on the basis of the phenomenology of visual experiences. 
However, there are relevant causal non-introspective considerations, which 
are also regularly used to justify the same conclusion, such as the theoretical 
possibility of producing a phenomenologically indiscriminable hallucination 
by activating the same proximate causes involved in genuine perception. 
This further step is a well-known premise of another argument based on the 
possibility of perceptual error, the radical “argument from hallucination”. 
Robinson, for example, argues that “it is necessary to give the same account 
of both hallucinating and perceptual experience when they have the same 
neural cause” (1994, p. 151). However, it seems clear that these introspective 
and causal non-introspective considerations must be supplemented with 
extra premises in order to establish that during every visual episode we 
are always immediately aware of something other than mind-independent 
physical objects and properties. The most controversial of these premises 
is premise (b) of the argument from illusion specifi ed above, which states 
that if it seems (visually) to you to be something that possesses a particular 
sensible quality, then there must be something of which you are aware that 
does possess that quality. 
In illusion, there sensibly appears to a subject to be something that 
possesses a particular quality, when in fact there is no candidate object in 
the environment that actually possesses that quality. In hallucination, there 
is no suitable worldly object at all that could satisfy how things appear 
sensibly for the subject. However, it is often supposed that in both cases there 
must be something of which the subject is aware that explains how things 
are from the subjective standpoint. Without this assumption, sometimes 
referred in the philosophical literature as the “phenomenal principle” 
(ROBINSON, 1994, p. 32), it seems implausible or arbitrary to argue that 
there are situations in which we are immediately aware of something other 
than the physical objects and properties that we allegedly perceive. In what 
follows I will not question this controversial assumption directly. Rather 
I will try to understand what are these “other things” implied by the truth 
of the phenomenal principle, which supposedly fi gure as the immediate 
objects of awareness in every conscious visual episode (including veridical 
perceptions, illusions and hallucinations) and evaluate whether their nature 
can be suffi ciently established and accommodated as a key component of 
an adequate philosophical theory of perception.
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For many years these “things” were often referred as “sense-data” and 
the theories that adopted this strategy as an unavoidable consequence of the 
arguments from perceptual error were baptized as “sense-data theories” of 
perception.3  Nowadays, the existence of sense-data is sometimes dismissed 
as inadequate or old-fashioned without further qualifi cations. However, I 
think that the inadequacy of the sense-data theory should not be taken for 
granted, particularly if we recall that some infl uential philosophers still insist 
that we need identical or similar entities to make sense of the phenomenology 
of visual experience.4 For the sense-data theorist in every visual experience 
there is something, a sense-datum that explains why –whether or not you 
are perceptually linked with the physical world– it seems to you as if you 
were. The essence of this theory rests on the unconditional acceptance of 
the phenomenal principle for all conscious visual episodes. Every visual 
experience seems to you a certain way because you are always immediately 
aware of real entities –which are not everyday physical objects or properties– 
that fully determine the phenomenal character of your experience. 
What is a sense-datum? The historically standard interpretation suggests 
that a sense-datum is a real entity that satisfi es the following minimal 
features: (i) immediacy, (ii) non-physicality, (iii) actual possession of every 
phenomenologically salient quality, (iv) mind-dependency, and (v) privacy. 
Let’s start with immediacy. We are immediately aware of an object x if and 
only if we are not aware of it by virtue of being aware of something else 
y. A sense-datum –unlike the physical objects that we take ourselves to 
perceive– is always something directly or immediately available in visual 
experience. Austin accurately expresses this central idea:
The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or 
otherwise perceive (or ‘sense’), or anyhow we never directly perceive or 
sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data. (AUSTIN, 
1962, p. 2)
Indeed, for a sense-data theorist the nature of any kind of visual 
experience is defi ned by the immediate awareness of these entities and 
not by the existence or non-existence of the relevant mind-independent 
physical objects and/or properties. One of the motivations underlying 
the immediacy of sense-data is undoubtedly epistemological. Sense-data 
theorists usually insist that if something is immediately given or presented in 
3 The terms “sense-data” and its singular “sense-datum” were introduced at the beginning 
of the 20th century by philosophers as a way of referring to the immediate objects of perception 
and to unify the different terms that early modern philosophers used for the same purposes 
(arguably), such as “ideas”, “impressions”, “images” or simply “appearances”. 
4 Check Robinson (1994), Foster (2000) and García-Carpintero (2001) 
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a direct way, then one must be certain or incapable of being mistaken about 
it. If sense-data are taken to be epistemologically fundamental, then only 
our beliefs about how things seem to us introspectively (about appearances) 
are foundational and certain. All other beliefs –particularly our empirical 
beliefs about external physical objects, relations and properties– are only 
probable or logically derived from those foundational beliefs that we form 
strictly on the basis of how things seem to be from the subject’s point of 
view. Fallibility, error and misperception make sense only when making 
reference to empirical mind-independent objects located beyond the limits 
of what is introspectively available, but not when we make introspective 
reports about how things seem to be.
The view common to all versions of the sense-datum theory that the 
perception of objects [external physical objects] is really a kind of inference 
seems to arise from a belief that, while perception proper must be infallible, 
inference need not be, and thus that all mistakes are fallacies. (QUINTON, 
1965, p. 502)
The second feature that characterizes sense-data is their non-physical 
ontological status. Given that according to the theory we don’t perceive 
immediately ordinary physical objects like chairs, tables or cars –but only 
unconventional actual entities different from them– it is very diffi cult to 
provide a positive characterization of the ontology of sense-data. Usually 
they are introduced only negatively, for example, saying that they are 
something other than physical objects or simply claiming that they are 
essentially non-physical. This negative approach, which defi nes sense-data 
only by contrast with ordinary physical objects, is the standard one.5 It is 
important to emphasize that in this interpretation “sense-datum” is not 
merely an instrumental term similar to many others postulated by science, 
a metaphorical expression or an empty linguistic name, such as Vulcano or 
Pegasus. On the contrary, according to the sense-data theory when we make 
introspective reports of the form “It seems to me as if there is a bent stick 
submerged in water”, the expression and its different terms denote a real 
non-physical entity. Now, this leads us to the third general characteristic I 
mentioned. These real non-physical entities actually instantiate and possess 
all the properties that determine what it is like for the subject to have the 
experience. If you are hallucinating and it looks to you as if there is a pink 
round balloon in the middle of your visual fi eld, then there is some balloon-
5 Indeed, there are different interpretations, such as Price’s neutral approach when he 
argues that a sense-datum is a neutral term which doesn’t entail the acceptance of “any 
particular theory” (1932, p. 19) or Ayer’s (1936) view in which a sense-datum is just a useful 
way to express what happens when we undergo an experience 
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like non-physical entity that really is round and pink. If you are having an 
illusion and it seems to you as if there is a bent stick submerged in water, 
then “bentness” is a real property possessed by a sense-datum. 
Finally, I will briefly introduce the last two features: (iv) mind-
dependency and (v) privacy. According to (iv) sense-data are entities whose 
existence is confi ned to our awareness of them. Unlike external physical 
entities, sense-data cannot exist independently of the visual experiences 
in which they fi gure.6 According to (v) a sense-datum is never available 
for public cognitive scrutiny.  Privacy should not be considered as ruling 
out cognitive access at all, but only as a way of constraining it to a single 
subject (logically private to the subject of experience). Mind-dependency 
and privacy taken together seem to demand a subjective metaphysics, 
according to which every object and qualitative-element consciously and 
immediately available to a subject S in a particular time when undergoing 
a visual experience is constitutively dependent on S’s visual experience. In 
the following two sections I will focus the discussion in two different sorts 
of problems (epistemological and ontological) linked to this subjective 
constitutive relation between non-physical objects and our acts of experiential 
awareness. Even though these problems are familiar and often identifi ed in 
the philosophical literature about sense-data, I think it is worth taking a new 
look at them with more clarity and in the context of new developments and 
interpretations in epistemology and the contemporary philosophy of mind. 
Skepticism and the external world
According to the sense-data theory the immediate objects of perceptual 
awareness are nothing like the public physical objects that we pre-
theoretically take it we perceive. On the contrary, a sense-datum is a non-
physical entity, which is mind-dependent and logically private to a single 
subject. From an epistemological perspective one of the main motivations 
of this theory is to fi nd a common foundational ground for the edifi cation 
of thought. Introspective reports and beliefs about what it is like to have a 
6 The standard approach is that a sense-datum must depend for its existence upon the 
subject’s awareness of it. However, this standard view differs from the one held by some 
early sense-data theorists. Price, for example, argues that the proposition that says sense-data 
“depend for their existence or for their qualities upon our awareness of them… is a gross 
absurdity, incompatible with the very connotations of the terms ‘existent’, ‘awareness’, and 
‘qualities’” (1932, p. 126) and Moore claims that “… the visual sensibles which I directly 
apprehend in looking at this paper still exist unchanged when I merely alter the position of 
my body by turning away my head or closing my eyes…” (1922, p. 168). For the sake of 
the argument I will consider here only the standard view that sense-data are indeed mind-
dependent. 
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visual experience are regarded as foundational and infallible given the nature 
of their immediate objects. By defi nition, sense-data are always as they seem 
to be, leaving no room for error at least at the immediate experiential level. 
Unfortunately, I assume (mainly because we do care about the history 
of philosophy) that we all know that when there is perceptual mediation 
of this particular kind skepticism about the external world comes alive. If 
we accept that in every perceptual episode we are exclusively in direct/
immediate contact with some actual non-physical entity that possesses 
all the properties consciously available during the experience, then it is 
mandatory to ask to what extent our immediate experiences provide us with 
reliable information about the external physical environment. The traditional 
worry associated with the sense-data theory is that our immediate objects of 
perceptual awareness could work as a veil that may persuade us to drop any 
reason to believe in the physical world and its mind-independent properties. 
What is in danger is the justifi cation of our beliefs about the external world. 
Sense-data theorists have historically supported two main strategies 
to deal with the problem of the external world. As Searle points, they 
either adopt views in which a sense-datum “is in some sense a copy or 
representation of the material object” (1983, p. 59) or quite differently in 
which “the object is somehow just a collection of sense data” (1983, p. 59). 
We can call the fi rst strategy “sense-data representationalism” and the second 
simply “phenomenalism”. Inspired by the work of Descartes and Locke, 
sense-data representationalists think that there must be some explanation 
for the regularities that we fi nd at the immediate subjective level of visual 
experience. Based on causal and explanatory inferences, these theorists 
claim that sense-data must stand for or represent the external material world 
more or less accurately.7 They insist that if sense-data resemble or represent 
to some degree the external physical objects/properties allegedly causally 
responsible for the visual experiences, then the empirical beliefs that we 
form on their basis are generally justifi ed. 
Despite its initial plausibility, sense-data representationalism conveys 
relevant problems. Probably the most familiar one is derived from the 
status of sense-data as the immediate objects of experience. If all that is 
immediately available during experiences are non-physical, private, mind-
dependent entities, we may wonder what are the grounds to claim that 
these entities actually stand or represent the mind-independent physical 
7 I say “more or less” because there might be different degrees to which sense-data 
allegedly represent the external world. For example, representing or resembling primary 
and secondary qualities, representing only primary qualities and fi nally only representing a 
structural isomorphism of the primary qualities 
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reality.8The diffi culty is simple, it has been argued that it is impossible to 
take x as a sign or representation of y unless we have independent access 
to both x and y. If we claim that we only have direct perceptual access to 
sense-data and that every instance of perceptual awareness involves an 
immediate acquaintance with a non-physical entity, then our grounds for 
inductive inference seem insuffi cient. 
Traditionally, to answer this question, sense-data representationalists 
emphasize that we need an explanation for the presence of some relevant 
features that characterize our visual experiences, such as their systematic 
order and coherence and the fact that we do not have voluntary control over 
them.9 They argue that the best explanation that we have for perceptual 
phenomena such as regularity and coherence is the postulation of a public 
external world constituted by physical objects and properties, which are 
causally responsible for the type of immediate experiences that we have. 
The idea of an external physical world causally responsible for the type 
of immediate experiences that we have is, in this sense, the product of an 
inference to the best explanation. Despite the fact that this is a plausible 
suggestion, I think that there are two important aspects to keep in mind. 
First, the conjectural status of the material world considered as the best 
explanation for what happens at the experiential level is not something that 
everyone would happily accept. Indeed, given the acceptance of sense-data 
as intermediaries the theory is highly unintuitive from the commonsense 
point of view. We don’t usually think of the physical realm as the result of 
an inference and, even though this might be a possible anti-skeptical way 
out for sense-data representationalism, the theory still needs to show that 
it is the best overall account of visual experience in offer.10 Second, what 
we might call a Humean skeptic might reject the legitimacy of this sort of 
inference to the best explanation on the basis of the regularity and coherence 
of our experience. Consider, for example, Robinson’s remarks on this issue:
8 The situation is even worst if we think that sense-data only possess “qualities which do 
not refer beyond themselves” (ROBINSON, 1994, p. 2). 
9 Despite the fact that we can modify some of the conditions for perception, for example, 
by changing the lighting conditions or that we are not constantly attending to all the features 
that characterize our experience, there are repeatable patterns of qualitative instances 
10 Alston has pointed out that explanatory arguments of this kind suffer from two serious 
diffi culties: “(a) No one has ever succeeded in making a plausible case for the superiority of 
this “standard” explanation to its alternatives, like the self-generation of sensory experiences 
or their direct production by a Cartesian demon or Berkeleian God. (b) More crucially, 
the patterns in experience cited as the explananda involve suppositions about the physical 
environment we could only know through perception, thus introducing a circularity in the 
argument” (1999, p. 227). 
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Any search for an explanation presupposes that there is something in need 
of an explanation – that is, something which is improbable unless explained. 
In this case, this would be so only if it were improbable that it should be a 
brute fact, without any explanation, that our experience should be highly 
ordered. We do, indeed, have a strong intuition that it is so. Our experience 
is suffi ciently highly structured for us to be able to interpret it as experience 
of a fairly stable physical world. Our natural response to this is to assume 
that experience has a cause; it doesn’t just happen in this ordered way by 
accident. In arguing this way from experience we are presuming that the fact 
that order requires an explanation is an a priori principle; we do not learn a 
posteriori that the order in the phenomena has a cause, for we have reason to 
believe that experience has a cause only if we take its orderedness as being 
evidence for such an hypothesis. The Humean tradition rejects the application 
of a priori probabilities to empirical questions. (ROBINSON, 1994, p. 216) 
Common sense tells us that if there are no causal constraints then 
we should not experience the clear perceptual regularities that we in 
fact do. If there are no causal restrictions, then it seems that every 
perceptual event has an equal probability and it would be quite odd to 
fi nd regularities such as the ones we usually have. However, the skeptic 
might reply that an ordered sequence is a priori no less probable than 
any other. He might take a dice and throw it, insisting that a priori –in 
every throw– any number has the same probability of 1 in 6. Perhaps 
there are ways of avoiding this problem.11  Nonetheless, the relevant point 
I want to make here is that this kind of Humean skeptical objection has 
had an enormous impact in the 20th century, causing some sense-data 
theorists to accept that we can’t have knowledge of the external physical 
realm, which supposedly causes our experiences. A good example of this 
philosophical trend is the second main strategy that I wanted to consider, 
phenomenalism. 
The phenomenalist strategy acknowledges the Humean idea that we 
are not justifi ed in making causal or explanatory inferences from sense-data 
to external physical objects. However, it grants that our beliefs about the 
external world can be said to be justifi ed and generally true because their 
content is restricted to our immediate experience of sense-data and the 
order and regularity they exhibit. Unlike sense-data representationalists, 
phenomenalists think that sense-data don’t represent or resemble the external 
world. Rather, they suggest that the immediate realm of sense-data is all 
11 For example, Robinson tries an alternative argument in which he decides to leave aside 
the probability of particular series in order to work with probabilities of types of series or 
“probabilities of series qua members of such a class” (1994, p. 217). 
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there is to know and that in some way it constitutes what we commonly 
think is our world. 
According to the phenomenalist, to believe that a physical or material object 
of a certain sort exists just is to believe that sense-data of various sorts have 
been experienced, are being experienced, will be experienced, and/or would 
be experienced under certain specifi able conditions. (BonJour, 2002, p. 136)
The counterfactual conditions under which sense-data could or would be 
experienced must be specifi ed exclusively in terms of what is immediately 
accessible to the subjects of experience. In this sense, the phenomenalist view 
of the physical world is fully understood in connection to actual and possible 
awareness of sense-data. Even though phenomenalism might initially strikes 
us as a highly bizarre and implausible view, it is important to mention that 
philosophers accepted it in the past and still insist upon some of its main 
commitments. Foster (2000; 2008), for example, has recently argued for 
an idealist view in which there is no physical mind-independent physical 
world causing or being responsible for the regularity of our perceptual 
experiences. Rather, he suggests that our organized and regular experiences 
create or confi gure what we usually understand as the “external world”. He 
thinks that the apparent externality exhibited by our immediate experiences 
is the consequence of the order and regularity exhibited by sense-data that 
move us to interpret (non-inferentially) our experiences as involving the 
awareness of something external. In other words, Foster wants us to accept 
“a system of perceptual experience which so misrepresents its own nature” 
(2000, p. 162). 
I think that these sophisticated attempts to make sense of the 
phenomenalist conclusion are not sufficiently convincing and carry 
unacceptable epistemological and metaphysical problems. First, it seems 
very unreasonable to hold that the complex regularity of our immediate 
experience has no explanation at all. If all the conditions under which 
sense-data are experienced must themselves be specifi ed in terms of sense-
data, phenomenalism –more than a plausible reinterpretation of ordinary 
experience– seems to be an argument for skepticism about the external world. 
Second, I do not see any non-arbitrary way to make sense of the alleged 
intrinsic order possessed by the reality of appearances independently of the 
physical world. Given its central role in the theory, this is not something that 
the phenomenalist can simply assume without a convincing story. Third, 
the phenomenalist also needs to address the problem about the content of 
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propositions about physical objects in the past. Consider for example the 
truth of propositions concerning the alimentary habits of Dinousars of the 
Cretaceous. Are they fully specifi able in terms of sense-data that have been 
experienced, are being experienced or would be experienced under certain 
circumstances? 
Finally, the phenomenalist is also confronted with serious objections 
regarding knowledge of other people’s mental states. Surely your conscious 
experiences are beyond the limits of what I immediately experience. If these 
events are outside my immediate experience, how do I reach conclusions 
about what you are genuinely thinking now? A reasonable thing to say is 
that I need to make inferences on the basis of my immediate experience. 
First, an inference from my immediate experience of sense-data to certain 
facts about your physical body, and second, an inference from facts about 
your body to some conclusions about your current mental states. However, 
as BonJour rightly points out, “both of these inferences depend on causal 
relations that are, according to the phenomenalist, unknowable” (2002, p. 
143). Apparently, any phenomenalist strategy to deal with the problem of 
others’ mental states needs to be addressed from a solipsist standpoint and 
this seems to be an unacceptable consequence.12 
The sense-data theory faces serious epistemological objections 
concerning skepticism about the external physical world. On the one hand, 
sense-data representationalists need to provide a more adequate account of 
the causal and explanatory inferences that form the basis of their theory, 
especially if they want to avoid the Humean skeptical challenge. On the 
other hand, phenomenalists who take the Humean objection seriously not 
only face skepticism about the external world and the existence of other 
minds, but also seem to lack enough resources to make sense non-arbitrarily 
of the complex regularities exhibited by our immediate experience. Even if 
there are options still available for the sense-data theorists, the search for an 
alternative model capable of explaining visual experience without sacrifi cing 
common sense is justifi ed. I think that the fundamental problem rests on 
the foundations of the sense-data approach, that is, on the acceptance of the 
basic metaphysics of actual non-physical objects demanded by the theory. 
This will be the topic of the next section.
12 I owe some of the crucial points of this section to BonJour’s (2002) excellent comments 
on these issues. 
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Sense data, subjectivism and physicalism
The alleged mind-dependency and privacy of sense-data demand what 
we might call a subjective metaphysical view about the immediate objects 
of visual awareness. According to this subjectivism, every object and 
qualitative-element consciously available to a subject S when undergoing 
a visual experience is constitutively dependent on S’s experience. In other 
words, sense-data are ontologically and existentially confi ned to particular 
episodes of presentational awareness. This account has a close resemblance 
to the ontology sometimes attributed to sensations and sensory objects. It is 
said that the existence of a particular sensation, like pain, is constituted by 
our awareness of the sensation in question. In the same fashion, the existence 
of a sense-datum is constitutively dependent on the subject’s experience. 
The sense-datum wouldn’t have existed if the subject were not aware of it. 
The constitutive dependency demanded by this subjective metaphysics 
has consequences not only for the nature of sense-data, but also for the 
nature of our experiences in general. For every visual experience there is 
always an actual existent object or an actual existent property-instance that 
constitutes the visual experience in a fundamental way. We might say that 
subjectivism is in this sense a rather strong view that requires not merely 
a causal connection, but a mutual metaphysical-constitutive link between 
objects and acts of awareness. On the one hand, the existence of a particular 
sense-datum essentially depends on the existence of a particular act or 
episode of visual awareness. On the other hand, the perceptual episode or 
sensory act is the conscious presence of a sense-datum. 
I think it doesn’t take too much effort to notice that this subjective 
metaphysics involves important problems. To think of a sense-datum 
as ontologically confi ned to a singular visual occurrence (perceptual or 
non-perceptual) is to think of it as something that cannot have existence 
outside this particular context of subjective responsiveness. According to 
this subjective traditional interpretation, a sense-datum is –using Foster’s 
terminology– defi ned internally as something that cannot exist independently 
in the physical world:
… we mean that, for each sense datum x, there is an episode of presentational 
awareness y, such that x is the object of y, and the fact of x’s being the object 
of y fully covers, and necessarily covers, all that is involved in the occurrence 
of x as a concrete ingredient of reality. Amongst other things, this will mean 
that a sense-datum cannot occur as the object of more than one episode of 
presentational awareness (it cannot be presented to different subjects or on 
different occasions), and that it cannot occur as an ingredient of the physical 
(mind-independent) world. (FOSTER, 2000, p. 164) 
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The subjective ontological characterization of sense-data plays an 
important role in contemporary discussions in the philosophy of language, 
particularly in connection with the problem of private language, our 
understanding of truth and the possibility of defi ning psychological terms 
on the basis of introspection alone.13 I will not consider this complex debate 
here, but I think it’s worth emphasizing that problems in the philosophy 
of language are sometimes symptoms of more fundamental problems at 
the metaphysical level. In this case the problem seems to be how to make 
sense of sense-data as subjective (constitutively dependent on the subject’s 
acts of awareness) and non-physical, insisting at the same time, on their 
metaphysical status of actual entities that really belong to the fabric of 
the world. I think sense-data theorists must provide an explanation of two 
different, but related issues that take the form of an ontological dilemma. 
First, they must explain how something can really exist and be confi ned 
to a single episode of subjective awareness. The subjective ontology of 
sense-data seems to be incompatible with their actuality as entities that 
really belong to the fabric of the world. Second, they must provide a clue 
to understand how something can be non-physical and, at the same time, a 
real component of the world, that is, an entity. The non-physical ontology of 
sense-data seems to be at odds with the physical ontology that we commonly 
attribute to objects and properties which are real and causally effi cacious.
Let’s discuss the fi rst horn of the ontological dilemma. The sense-data 
theorist needs to explain how something can really exist and yet be confi ned 
to single episodes of subjective awareness. The “real existence” of sense-data 
seems to be incompatible with the fact that they are mind-dependent and 
logically private entities. The philosophical literature on sense-data theories 
provides some alternatives to address this issue. I will closely follow Foster’s 
(2000, pp. 166-170) excellent categorization of these alternatives into three 
different accounts that have historically dominated the discussion. Indeed, 
paraphrasing Foster I will show that none of them are fully satisfactory. Let’s 
start with the traditional interpretation (the interpretation that we have been 
generally following in this paper), that there is a constitutive link between 
our visual experiences and the kind of objects we are immediately aware 
of. In this view, the existence of a particular sense-datum fully depends on 
the subject’s particular act of awareness:
13 I am thinking especially of Wittgenstein’s anti-private language argument and the 
idea that private entities, such as sense-data cannot be the objects of linguistic or semantic 
reference. In this respect it is highly advisable to check Wittgenstein’s (1993, p. 290) 
early remarks on sense-data in his Rhees’ Lectures given in 1936 and his highly infl uential 
discussion in the Philosophical Investigations (2001). 
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[Traditional interpretation] The existence of any sense-datum is constituted 
by its phenomenal presentation to a subject S at time t. The existence of a 
sense-datum is in this sense nothing more or less than the obtaining of the 
subject’s act of awareness.
This interpretation may explain the alleged mind-dependency and 
privacy that characterize sense-data, but it is problematic for a different 
reason. It attempts to derive the existence of sense-data from facts about 
them. What constitutes the existence of a sense-datum is specifi ed by virtue 
of specifying facts of the sense-datum itself. We are not suggesting that the 
idea of an ontological derivative entity is unintelligible or incoherent. Indeed, 
we can think about all sorts of entities that are said to derive their existence 
or be constituted by a set of more fundamental facts. We might think, for 
example, of molecules as constituted by atoms or of cars as constituted by 
more basic entities such as engines, doors, etc. The worry is that to provide 
an explanation of x’s existence appealing to a fact or set of facts about x itself 
is unsatisfactory.14 In other words, I sympathize with the idea that “the claim 
that the sense-datum is ontologically available to feature in the presentational 
fact is in direct confl ict with the claim that it derives its existence from this 
fact” (FOSTER, 2000, p. 167).
Now, it is surely possible to say that this interpretation simply does not 
capture the relevant point about the existence or constitution of these non-
physical entities. It could be argued that sense-data theorists do not need to 
say that the existence of a particular sense-datum derives from or originates 
from certain facts about itself. Rather differently, a theorist could simply 
argue –à la Berkeley– for the existence of sense-data in the following fashion:
[Esse est percipi interpretation] The existence of a particular sense-datum and 
its sensory presentation to a subject S at time t are one and the same thing.
Like the traditional interpretation, the “esse est percipi” alternative also 
makes sense of the privacy and mind-dependency that characterize sense-
data, this time without appealing derivatively to facts about or derived from 
the entities themselves. However, there is something again deeply puzzling 
about this line of argumentation. It is not that it is incoherent, but only that 
it is hard to consider how the existence of something could simply be or 
14 Foster points out that we cannot coherently suppose that the existence of the sense-
datum is constituted by facts about itself, mainly because “in supposing its existence to be 
derivative from these facts, we would be supposing that it was not available for the facts to 
be about” (2000, p.167). 
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consist of its presentation to a subject. It is even harder if we think that one of 
the main features of sense-data is their logical privacy. Foster, for example, 
clearly identifi es this problem when he complains that “given any entity x, 
subject S, and time t, unless x has a form of existence which is distinct from 
its being presented to S at t, it will not have the right kind of ontological 
independence to be able to stand in that relationship” (2000, p. 167). 
When we think about the immediate objects of perceptual awareness, 
we think of them as entities that are related or presented to the subjects of 
experience in a certain way. In this sense, we naturally attribute to the objects 
of experience certain transcendence beyond the constraints of the perceptual 
act for a precise reason, namely that we think of relations as involving 
distinct relata. Therefore, the thought that the existence of a sense-datum 
and its sensory presentation to a subject at a certain time are one and the 
same thing is highly unsatisfactory and controversial.
These previous considerations motivate a further alternative that the 
sense-data theorists could take in order to determine the ontological status of 
these entities. They could argue that the existence of a sense-datum and its 
private presentation are constituted by the subject’s being in a mental state 
distinct from the occurrence of the sense-datum itself. This approach also 
makes sense of the alleged privacy and mind-dependence that characterize 
sense-data and, at the same time, preserves the fundamental act/object 
distinction that seems to be required by the theory.
[Mental state interpretation] The existence and presentation of a particular 
sense-datum is constituted by the subject’s being in a mental state different 
from the actual occurrence and phenomenal presence of the sense-datum.
This interpretation not only implies the idea that the existence of a 
sense-datum is confi ned to the instantiation of a psychological state without 
being itself such a brain/mental state. It also states that for any particular 
sense-datum there is a mental state that –when realized– suffi ces for its 
existence. At fi rst sight, this strategy seems very appealing. Nevertheless, I 
think that after careful consideration of its main elements it is clear that it 
threatens some of the defi nitional aspects of the sense-data theory. We have 
been emphasizing that the sense-data theory is not only a theory about the 
immediate objects of visual experience, but also a theory about the nature 
of experiences themselves. It is said that it is a subjectivist approach, mainly 
because the bringing about of a mental state is suffi cient for the existence 
of a perceptually manifest sense-datum. Bearing this in mind, there are 
two problematic issues that seem to follow immediately if we consider this 
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ontological subjectivism in conjunction with the “mental state interpretation” 
that we are examining.
First, we don’t have a clear uncontroversial characterization of a 
psychological state different from but suffi cient for the presentation of 
sense-data. Indeed, even if there is such a state it seems very diffi cult to 
apply the relevant distinction required by the theory. Remember that sense-
data philosophers need to provide an explanation of how it is possible for 
a psychological state (a visual experience), which is not identical with the 
immediate object of awareness and its features, to suffi ce –when realized– for 
the real existence of this object and its features. Sense-data theorists have 
barely accomplished this task, especially if we consider that this needs to be 
valid to all visual scenarios, including illusions and hallucinatory instances. 
Second, the sense-data theorist might be tempted to say that the 
activation of brain states could play the role of being distinct and suffi cient 
for the existence of sense-data. The idea would be that the activation of the 
relevant proximate neural causes is suffi cient to bring about the existence of 
a sense-datum ontologically distinct from the experience, but constitutive of 
the overall visual psychological state. It is at this stage that the sense-data 
theory enters into deep problems given that it embraces an ontology that 
posits non-physical entities and non-physical properties allegedly located 
outside the physical space. If the existence of sense-data is to be explained 
in terms of the activation of neurophysiological states of the brain, then 
we need a convincing story about how something physical can suffi ciently 
bring about or cause a non-physical sense-datum. Unfortunately, the more 
we think about causation, the clearer becomes that the dualist ontology that 
underlies the sense-data-theory is highly problematic for several reasons 
that have been acknowledged by many contemporary discussions in the 
philosophy of mind. 
These previous considerations put forward the second horn of the 
ontological dilemma that we mentioned in the early paragraphs of this 
section. How can something be non-physical and at the same time a real 
component of the fabric of the world? The non-physical ontology of sense-
data seems to be at odds with the physical ontology that we commonly 
attribute to objects and properties which are real and causally effi cacious. 
From a naïve pre-theoretical standpoint, when we perceive objects/properties 
we assume that they possess a physical underlying structure and that they 
are located in space and time. We allegedly perceive chairs, tables, cars and 
lemons and we assume, for example, that these physical objects of awareness 
cannot occupy the same location at the same time. However, based on the 
arguments from illusions and hallucination sense-data theorists claim that 
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what we immediately perceive in all visual contexts are non-physical actual 
entities. If this is the case, then the sense-data theory is fundamentally 
incompatible with what I take to be the dominant theory in the philosophy 
of mind during the last decades, namely physicalism. 
According to physicalism everything is physical or supervenes on the 
physical. In the present context this entails the view that conscious visual 
experiences are neurophysiological states of the brain or at least supervene 
upon those neurophysiological states of the brain. Regarding the immediate 
objects of visual experience, the physicalist point of view states that these 
objects must be identical or supervenient with physical objects or properties. 
A sense-datum –given its non-physical nature and actuality– is something 
simply unacceptable from a physicalist standpoint. I will not argue for any 
general or specifi c version of physicalism here. This task would take us far 
beyond the scope of this paper.15  Nonetheless, I think it is very important 
to emphasize that physicalism has been embraced by most contemporary 
philosophers of mind not just because the idea that everything is physically 
constituted is more appealing on the face of our pre-theoretical standpoint 
about visual experience and the science of perceptual processes. There are 
also serious philosophical considerations that suggest that physicalism is 
better placed than its Cartesian inspired rival theories (substance or property 
dualism) at the moment of explaining mind-body interaction.16  The sense-
data theory and the non-physical nature of the entities that it postulates does 
not really help to explain how our mentality is so deeply integrated in the 
causal physical network:
The more we think about causation, the clearer becomes our realization that 
the possibility of causation between distinct objects depends on a shared 
space-like coordinate system in which these objects are located, a scheme 
that individuate objects by their “locations” in the scheme. Are there such 
15 I am asking the reader, for the sake of the argument, to assume that the ontological 
thesis of physicalism is better placed than dualism in the present context. However, since 
I will not present a detailed argument to back up this assumption here, I grant committed 
dualists will be unpersuaded by some of the remarks at the end of this section. 
16 The general idea behind dualism in its two most signifi cant versions (substance dualism 
and property dualism) is that the mental and the material world are essentially different in 
kind. Unlike dualists, physicalists and idealists think that everything must be understood as 
belonging to one and the same fundamental kind. Physicalism, understood minimally as the 
thesis that everything that causally interacts with the physical world must be itself physical, 
rests on the so-called completeness of physics or causal closure of the physical realm. For 
an overall discussion of this topic please check Gillet & Lower (2001). For a physicalist 
standpoint take a look at Kim (2005) and Papineau (2002). For a defense of Cartesian dualism 
check Foster (1991). 
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schemes other than physical space? I don’t believe we know of any. (KIM, 
2005, p. 91)17
I think that the claim that spatiotemporality plays a central role when 
explaining causal relations is uncontroversial.18 In this sense, even if we 
accept something like the reality of appearances –like sense-data theorists 
do on the basis mind/body dualism– it seems crucial to address the following 
question in a straightforward way: If sense-data are not located in the 
physical space, where are they? Somebody might be tempted to sacrifi ce the 
traditional interpretation, arguing that we need to identify sense-data with 
brain states and claim that they are literally located in one’s head. This is 
clearly mistaken since brain states do not have the properties consciously 
available to us during visual experiences. The neurophysiological state 
involved in seeing a door, for example, is obviously not door-shaped. A 
rather different way out of the problem could be to say that sense-data are 
located where the physical objects causing them are located. This is clearly 
unsatisfactory and inconsistent given the possibility of having perfectly 
matching hallucinatory experiences in which there are no objects available 
in the subject’s environment that could play that causal role. Assuming that 
17 Kim notices the importance of physical space when addressing a fundamental diffi culty 
in the philosophy of mind, namely how something outside physical space –such as a Cartesian 
mind or a sense-datum– could causally interact with regular objects located in physical space. 
In particular, he is concerned about the so-called “pairing problem” in which two or more 
different simultaneous events or facts (for example, the fi ring of two different guns, A and 
B) cause different, but simultaneous effects (for example, the death of two different people: 
John and Peter). If we need to specify the correct pairings of cause and effect in a particular 
case of physical causation (for example, if we need to establish that it was the fi ring of A 
and not of B that caused John´s death) we normally appeal to spatial locations and spatial 
relations such as distance, orientation, etc. According to Kim, the same applies to perceptual 
relations and most intentional phenomena. However, if we characterize perceptual experiences 
in terms of direct acquaintance with sense-data that by defi nition are not located in physical 
space we cannot appeal to a physical coordinate system in order to establish at least a unique 
location (at a time) for a non-physical entity. Kim´s insight invites us to avoid any ontological 
commitment with non-physical entities if we want to establish correct pairing relations. 
18 Following Kim´s (2005) advice we have suggested that causal relations between 
physical objects, facts or events depend on their spatiotemporal relations to each other. This 
is certainly true of the Humean regularity account of causation in which contiguity in space 
and time is required and of many other philosophical accounts of causation. However, there 
are some contemporary theories of causation –like the probabilistic theories– that embrace 
the possibility that our world might be fundamentally indeterministic as implied by quantum 
mechanics. In these worlds causes need not be constantly conjoined with their effects. A 
full discussion of spacetime and its relevance as a requirement for causation is beyond the 
boundaries of this paper. I encourage the reader to check Pooley’s (2008) and Hitchcock’s 
(2008) excellent introductions on these issues. 
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sense-data have spatial properties like size and shape, the only two remaining 
alternatives seem to be linked with the phenomenology of appearances: 
Either (a) sense-data are located where they appear to be, or (b) sense-data 
are located in what is sometimes referred to as “phenomenal space”.
Let’s consider fi rst the view (a), that sense-data are positioned wherever 
they appear to be.19 Following Huemer (2001) we may envisage at least 
two important objections against this alternative. First, there are possible 
scenarios that might confl ict with the special theory of relativity, that “there is 
no objective time ordering to space like separated events, and that apparently 
implies that such events cannot be causally related” (HUEMER, 2001, p. 
154). Consider an experience of seeming to see something x very far away. 
The sense-data theory requires the appearance of a particular sense-datum 
roughly at the same time the brain states associated with your experience 
are activated. In other words, it requires the sense-datum to exist, while you 
have the experience of seeming to see something x. However, it is possible to 
envisage cases in which the objects seen appear so far away that, according 
to the theory of relativity, literally nothing could get from my brain to the 
apparent location in the time it takes for the subject to have the experience. 
Huemer’s fi rst objection rests in the truth of theoretical assumptions 
about the relativity theory that I will not pursue further. However, he moves 
forward and suggests a second objection that strikes me as more intuitive 
and commonsensical. Huemer points out that when considering this 
interpretation (a) we need to pay attention not only to scenarios in which 
we dream about events taking place in non-existent or fi ctional places, but 
also to the possibility of hallucinating such events. Keeping in mind that 
we are assessing the view that sense-data are located wherever they appear 
to be, he invites us to imagine a brain in a vat scenario in which the brain 
is having and has been having its whole life just hallucinations. The brain 
has seemed to be living in Tolkien’s Middle Earth:
When the brain has one of its experiences as of seeing a unicorn, the unicorn 
sense datum appears “in front of” the brain. But since the brain doesn’t have 
any eyes, what counts as “in front of” the brain? Perhaps where the frontal 
lobes are. But why should that direction count as “where the unicorn appears 
to be”? The brain in a vat has no awareness of its own frontal lobes. The 
brain might not even know what a brain is. In what sense, then, does the 
unicorn the brain thinks it is seeing appear to be in that place which is in fact 
in front of the brain’s frontal lobes? (HUEMER, 2001, p. 158)
19 Jackson (1977) can be interpreted as saying something similar when he claims that 
“when X looks further away than Y, there are sense-data which actually are different distances 
away” (p. 103). 
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This thought-experiment helps to undermine the idea that sense-data 
are in the places where they appear to be. Given that we are talking about 
a fi ctional place –Tolkien’s Middle Earth– the supposed place in which a 
sense-datum appears to be simply does not exist. There can be no such place. 
Experiences of non-existent places, such as vivid dreams of fi ctional places, 
and other thought experiments in which it is simply inappropriate to use 
spatial coordinates such as “in front” or “to the back” have motivated some 
philosophers to postulate (b), the idea that sense-data are located in their own 
peculiar and separate space that we cannot identify with the physical space.
I think that this fi nal possibility (b) that states that sense-data are located 
in a rather peculiar “phenomenal space” is simply ad hoc, given the enormous 
diffi culties that sense-data theorists need to face if they want to specify a 
coherent notion of space different from the physical one. We have seen how 
diffi cult is to make sense of the idea of a non-physical entity. In this sense, the 
task of specifying a non-physical “space” in which these entities are actually 
“located” seems even more inappropriate if not impossible. As Huemer 
(2001) points out, a “phenomenal space” seems to be unintelligible from 
the point of view of theory of relativity which holds that space and time are 
strictly speaking not two separate things, but just a unitary four-dimensional 
manifold usually associated with the notion “spacetime”. Secondly, there are 
wider and signifi cant problems regarding the connection or relation existent 
between the physical space and the phenomenal space. Specifi cally, we need 
an explanation about how events that occur in physical space can causally 
interact with events that occur in the phenomenal space if these spaces are 
fundamentally different. 
Like in the case of sense-data, we need an account of the nature of 
phenomenal space compatible with the view that mental states and events 
are the outcome of natural physical processes subject to natural laws.  If 
we do not have a clear natural understanding of the relationships existent 
between phenomenal space and physical space, then I do not see the 
advantage of taking this point of view in particular. In spite of the different 
ways or modes of presentations in which perceptual phenomena sometimes 
strike the subjects of experience, I would rather suggest a view in which 
phenomenal space and physical space are mutually dependent, sharing at 
the metaphysical level the same sort of fundamental properties. This is of 
course an alternative not available for the sense-data approach.20 
20 For a detailed discussion of phenomenal space in connection with the theory of relativity 
and natural laws see Huemer (2001, pp. 159-168). It is worth pointing out, that there are 
other familiar problems connected with the non-physical nature of sense-data that I will not 
consider, such as the issue of three-dimensionality, depth or determinacy/indeterminacy. 
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Introspection and mind-dependence
 Despite the serious metaphysical and epistemological consequences 
that seem to be involved in the sense-data theory of visual experience 
some theorists suggest that the existence of sense-data is something 
phenomenologically self-evident or indubitable on the basis of introspection. 
They think there are certain phenomenological aspects of perception that 
simply strike us as evident. It is the “obviousness” of these introspectable 
phenomenal features that lies at the heart of the arguments for the existence 
of sense-data or equivalent entities. As a good example, consider Robinson´s 
phenomenal principle with particular emphasis in those cases in which we 
hallucinate:
If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a 
particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is 
aware which does possess that sensible quality. (ROBINSON, 1994, p. 32) 
Even if the subject of experience is hallucinating, Robinson´s 
phenomenal principle forces us to accept that in these cases there indeed 
something of which the subject is aware that actually has all the qualitative 
features phenomenally manifest during the experience. Several years before 
Robinson, H.H. Price didn’t hesitate when he said that “this principle cannot 
indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable” (1932, p. 63). 
Price claimed that there are many things we can actually doubt regarding 
the nature of our perceptual states, except that there are certain features 
that indeed exist, even in the hallucinatory cases, and that they are “directly 
present to my consciousness”:
When I see a tomato there is much I can doubt. I can doubt whether there 
is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can 
doubt whether there is any material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took 
for a tomato was really a refl ection; perhaps I am even the victim of some 
hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red 
patch of a round somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background 
of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this 
whole fi eld of colour is directly present to my consciousness. (PRICE, 1932, 
p. 3 (my emphasis)) 
In these passages, introspection is considered as an infallible faculty 
that reveals that there is something existing that actually possesses all the 
phenomenal properties consciously available during a visual experience. The 
central issue here is the phenomenology of experience and how to make sense 
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of it. Some philosophers think that the sense-data theory gives an adequate 
answer to what is introspectively available in these cases.21 Allegedly there 
is always (in every visual experience, including hallucinations, illusions and 
successful perceptions) something constitutively dependent on the subject´s 
awareness that undoubtedly exists and that actually instantiates all the 
phenomenal properties available during conscious experience. Ironically, 
philosophers who deny the existence of sense-data have also suggested 
that this debate can also be settled solely on the basis of how things seem 
from the subject’s standpoint. Reichenbach, for example, says that during 
successful perceptual experiences what we immediately observe are “things, 
not impressions. I see tables, and house, and thermometers, and trees, and 
men, and the sun, and many other things in the sphere of crude physical 
objects” (1938, p. 164). Like many others, he accepts the pre-theoretical 
naïve view and thinks that introspectively, objects do not seem to be private 
mind-dependent entities. 
Enemies and friends of the sense-data theory seem to use introspection 
to ground their ontological intuitions. In order to address this paradox I 
will introduce what I take to be the denial of the subjective metaphysics 
implicit on the sense-data theory, sometimes called the “Transparency 
Thesis”. Then, in the fi nal section of the paper, I will argue that neither the 
subjective metaphysics of sense-data nor its denial can be held solely on the 
basis of introspection. This lack of introspective grounds for the truth of the 
subjective metaphysics of sense-data opens the possibility for an alternative 
account of perceptual experience and illustrates that all we can tell on the 
basis of introspection is that there is something common across perceptual 
and non-perceptual instances, but nothing at all about the specifi c nature of 
the immediate objects and properties being manifest.
Transparency and transparency*
As a reductio ad absurdum of our pre-theoretical intuitions about the 
nature of perception and visual experience, the sense-data theory is certainly 
very radical. We have seen that sense-data are not only actual entities, 
but also ontologically subjective or constitutively dependent on singular 
subjective episodes of visual awareness. If we accept that the immediate 
21 Even though Price acknowledges that there is something that is red, in the same quotation 
he remains neutral about the ontology of sense-data claiming that “what the red patch is, 
whether it is physical or psychical or neither, are questions that we may doubt about. But 
that something is red and round then and there I cannot doubt” (Price, 1932, p. 3). In this 
sense, we might say that Price´s account is less controversial than other traditional sense-data 
theories. 
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objects of visual experience are always real entities constitutively dependent 
on our subjective acts of awareness, then it follows that veridical perceptions, 
illusions and hallucinations share a fundamental aspect, namely, that as 
experiences they always suffi ce for the real existence of their immediate 
objects. For example, a perceptual experience of a bent stick submerged in 
water, is not only suffi cient for the real existence of something non-physical 
that looks like a stick, but also for the actuality of all the properties that 
characterize the experience, such as “bentness”. In the same fashion, a 
hallucinatory experience as of a pink rat is suffi cient for the real existence 
of a “rat-looking” non-physical entity that actually possesses the real non-
physical property of “pinkness”. In other words, according to sense-data 
theorists the occurrence of a particular experiential episode at a particular 
time t1, regardless of the actual state of affairs in the physical environment 
at t1, is suffi cient for the real existence of the objects/properties consciously 
manifest to the subject at t1.
The idea that our experiences are constitutive –suffi cient for the 
existence– of the objects and properties of perception is in tension with 
our pre-theoretical naïve understanding of those objects and properties as 
physical and mind-independent. We usually assume that what is consciously 
available when we undergo a genuine perceptual experience does not 
depend in any ontologically signifi cant way on our awareness for existing. 
We do not ordinarily think of perceptual experiences as the kind of states 
or mental events that can constitute the existence of what we are aware of. 
On the contrary, we think of perceptual experiences as mental states that in 
some way put us in touch with physical objects and properties instantiated 
in the environment. By means of our experiences –assuming that our visual 
mechanisms are working correctly– we aim to get information about the 
mind-independent physical world that might help us for the achievement 
of different tasks. If we think that this is the case it is because we think that 
perceptual objects are independent of our experiences of them.
The assertion of the mind-independence of the immediate objects of 
visual experience is of course inconsistent with the truth of the subjective 
ontology held by sense-data theorists. Indeed, those who deny the subjective 
ontology of sense-data usually think and characterize visual experiences as 
being essentially “transparent”. The so called “Transparency Thesis” –like 
its negative subjective counterpart– involves a claim not only about the 
nature of the objects and properties that are manifest when undergoing an 
experience, but also about the experiential states themselves and whether 
or not they constitute the relevant objects of experience:
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[Transparency Thesis] Every object and qualitative-feature consciously 
manifest to a subject S when undergoing a perceptual experience is not 
constitutively dependent on S’s experience.
This formulation is basically a claim about the nature of the immediate 
objects/properties that determine what-it-is-like to have a perceptual 
experience.22 The Transparency Thesis denies the mind-dependency of the 
immediate objects of perception as characterized by the sense-data theory. 
In this sense, the Transparency Thesis is closely related to the naïve pre-
theoretical idea that perceptual experiences are “open to the world”. Like 
the alleged “openness” that characterizes commonsense, the Transparency 
Thesis acknowledges that the immediate objects of perception are not 
constituted by the experiences we have of them.   
However, it is important to point out that “openness” and “transparency” 
are sometimes used in the philosophical literature in a weaker sense that 
doesn’t entail the denial of the subjective metaphysics of sense-data. In its 
weaker version, “transparency” is merely a term sometimes used to capture 
the idea that introspection of what visual experiences are like only reveals 
what these experiences are about. I take it that it is in this weaker sense that, 
for example, Valberg claimed that “if we are open to our experience, all we 
fi nd is the world” (1992, p. 18) or that Moore (1903) famously argued that 
visual experiences were diaphanous. Under this interpretation “transparency” 
is only a thesis about introspection, specifi cally about what we fi nd when 
we introspect our visual experiences or when we “look inwards”. Let’s refer 
to this interpretation as the “Transparency* Thesis”:
[Transparency* Thesis] When we introspect experiences one is aware only 
of what the experience is about and not of the experience itself. 
The distinction between transparency (as specifi ed in the Transparency 
Thesis) and transparency* (as specifi ed in the Transparency* Thesis) 
suggests that it is only the former that confl icts with the sense-data view 
that the immediate objects of visual experiences are always fully subjective 
(mind-dependent and logically private) non-physical real entities that bear 
a constitutive link with the experiences in which they fi gure. Unfortunately, 
there is an important aspect to the debate between the Transparency 
Thesis and the sense-data theory that really troubles me, and which I think 
deserves attention. Often, people that want to accept the subjective reality of 
22 I want to acknowledge that my formulation of the Transparency Thesis is inspired by 
Martin’s (forthcoming, Ch.3) excellent discussion of this issue. 
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appearances and people who want to reject it equally appeal to introspection 
alone as the crucial element for determining the nature of the immediate 
objects of visual experiences. It seems that they take transparency* as 
the fi nal criterion for deciding between the sense-data theory and the 
Transparency Thesis.  
I want to provide some brief comments that may help us to decide 
if the Introspective Thesis can actually help to clarify the metaphysical 
debate. The task will involve (i) an epistemic evaluation regarding what is 
introspectively available when we undergo perceptual experiences and (ii) 
an assessment of the possibility of deciding conclusively about the nature 
of the immediate objects of perception solely on the basis of introspective 
awareness. I will suggest that introspection is neutral and cannot ground 
either the truth of the ontological subjectivism inherent to the sense-data 
view or the truth of the Transparency Thesis. 
Introspection
What is the role of introspection when discussing the nature of 
perceptual experiences? Imagine I ask you to focus your visual attention 
on a particular area of your visual fi eld. Let’s assume that you are seeing 
a red tomato. In attending to that particular tomato you seem to be aware 
of certain features or properties instantiated as being out there in the mind-
independent world, such as, for example, the “redness” or “plumpness” of 
the particular tomato. Suppose that I ask you now to look “inward” and 
focus your attention on what we might call the experience itself in order to 
check if you fi nd inner objects or properties intrinsic to your experience. 
You would probably agree with me, that no matter how hard you try you 
will not fi nd these inner additional features, apart from the redness and 
plumpiness of the tomato. It is as if your visual awareness inevitably went 
through the experience itself, onto worldly objects and properties. Indeed, 
everything suggests that during visual experience perceivers are only aware 
of the objects and properties the experiences are about. According to this 
interpretation, experiences are transparent* because introspection does not 
reveal any properties of the experiences themselves. Tye clearly has this 
view in mind:
Consider fi nally the problem of transparency. Why is it that perceptual 
experiences are transparent? When you turn your gaze inward and try to 
focus your attention on intrinsic features of these experiences, why do you 
always seem to end up attending to what the experiences are of? Suppose 
you have a visual experience of a shiny, blood-soaked dagger. Whether, like 
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Macbeth, you are hallucinating or whether you are seeing a real dagger, you 
experience redness and shininess as outside you, as covering the surface of 
a dagger. Now try to become aware of your experience itself, inside you, 
apart from its objects. Try to focus your attention on some intrinsic feature 
of the experience that distinguishes it from other experiences, something 
other than what it is an experience of. The task seems impossible: one’s 
awareness seems always to slip through the experience to the redness and 
shininess, as instantiated together externally. In turning one’s mind inward to 
attend to the experience, one seems to end up scrutinizing external features 
or properties. (TYE, 1995, pp. 135-136)
In this passage, Tye is clearly using “transparency” as a feature of our 
visual experiences in order to emphasize that introspection only reveals 
objects and their properties. In other words, for him experiences are 
transparent*, given that when we introspect a visual experience we are only 
aware of what the experience is about and not of the experience itself. Grice, 
for example, seems the endorse a similar standpoint:
If we were asked to pay close attention, on a given occasion, to our seeing 
or feeling as distinct from what was being seen or felt, we should not know 
how to proceed; and the attempt to describe the differences between seeing 
and feeling seems to dissolve into a description of what we see and what 
we feel. (GRICE, 1962, p. 144)
For Grice and Tye experiences are transparent*, that is, invisible in the 
sense that we look-through (so to speak) them and we become aware only 
of what our experiences are about. Introspectively, during perception we 
fi nd what is seen and not the intrinsic qualities of the experience of seeing 
itself. Introspection of the phenomenology of our visual experiences does 
not reveal anything to us but the objects that we purportedly perceive. My 
concern is that this transparency* exhibited by visual experiences seems 
to be fully compatible with both sides of the ontological debate about the 
nature of the immediate objects of visual experience. Transparency* seems 
to be fully compatible with those who defend the phenomenal principle and 
the idea that we in every case we immediately perceive sense-data, and also 
with those theorists that think that what it is experientially manifest doesn’t 
necessarily need to be actual, real and non-physical.
On the one hand, sense-data theorists typically claim that we see physical 
things mediately by virtue of seeing real sensory items that we take to 
correspond to those physical things. What it is introspectively available are 
not modifi cations of one’s visual experiences, but actually the immediate 
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objects of the experience. These immediate objects or sense-data are –
according to the phenomenal principle– always real entities that actually 
possess the properties that they exhibit. On the other hand, those who deny 
the phenomenal principle and the alleged reality of appearances may accept 
that this is appropriate in veridical perception and for some of the features 
involved in illusory experiences, but certainly not in the case of hallucination. 
In non-perceptual episodes, they say that visual experiences can be about 
objects and properties, which are not real or actual. Interestingly, despite a 
fundamental disagreement regarding the nature of the objects and properties 
consciously available in visual experience, both sides can, in principle, 
perfectly agree that when we look inward all we fi nd is what experiences 
are about and not qualitative features of the experiences. In short, I think 
that friends and enemies of sense-data can agree that visual experiences are 
transparent* on the basis of introspection.23  
The sense-data theory should say that these introspectively available 
objects and properties are non-physical real entities, which are private and 
mind-dependent. In contrast theorists who want to deny this subjective 
metaphysics must claim that, at least during genuine perceptual episodes, 
these objects and properties are in some way objective, that is, mind-
independent and publicly available for introspection and demonstrative 
identifi cation. The disagreement is clearly about the plausibility of the 
Transparency Thesis, a metaphysical thesis regarding the nature of the 
subject matter of experience, and not about the Transparency* Thesis. 
However, is it possible to settle the dispute appealing only to introspection? 
Let us take a look at transparency considered as the denial of the 
subjectivist ontology of sense-data. From a metaphysical perspective, the 
Transparency Thesis demands that every object and qualitative feature 
consciously manifest to a subject S when undergoing a perceptual experience 
is not constitutively dependent on S’s experience. The important question 
in the present context is: Does introspection show the relevant objects and 
properties, which appear to us when we have visual experiences, to be 
mind-independent? There is a natural naïve pre-theoretical inclination that 
23 Please bear in mind two important issues. First, the Transparency* Thesis is often used 
as a way of rejecting the idea that perception involves the conscious awareness of qualia 
or qualitative intrinsic features of the experiences. In this paper I simply assume that the 
qualitative aspects of visual experience can be fully explained in terms of what our experiences 
are about. Secondly, there are theories, such as adverbialism, which not only reject the 
phenomenal principle and the ontology of sense-data, but also any act-object characterization 
of visual perception. For the sake of the argument I am certainly not considering adverbialism 
or equivalent views among the theories on dispute. 
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mind-independence is given within introspective grounds, or at least is 
something derivable a priori from how things appear to be. However, that 
there is a natural inclination or tendency to think that perceptual objects 
are not constitutively dependent on our awareness of them doesn’t seem 
enough to establish a priori the truth of the Transparency Thesis. Hume, 
for example, argued that this inclination to assume the mind-independency 
of perceptual objects as an undeniable truth, solely on the basis of what we 
can tell by introspection, seems to be something upon which human beings 
naturally and spontaneously rely. 
… when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always 
suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, 
and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representation 
of the other. (HUME, 1975, pp. 151-152)
For Hume the system in which the “vulgar” naturally relies is of course 
false and based on the fi ctional supplementation of the imagination. For 
different reasons he also criticized what he called the “philosophical system”, 
grounded on the double existence or distinction between the existence of our 
mind-dependent perceptions and the mind-independent perceptual objects. 
For the present purposes, what strikes me as problematic is the nature of the 
disagreement between those who deny the Transparency Thesis and those 
who unconditionally assume it. Why do they disagree if the subject matter 
of the dispute is supposed to be introspectively obvious or self-evident?
Most people accept the vulgar or  pre-theoretical naïve view and thinks 
that, introspectively, objects do not seem to be private mind-dependent 
entities. Nonetheless, it is possible for a sense-data theorist to say that the 
immediate objects of perceptual experience are thoroughly subjective and 
exist only in virtue of our being aware of them, while insisting that the 
alleged externality or mind-independency is something that we, as subjects 
of the experiences, attribute to them. In simple words, the sense-data 
theory admits that all that we require to challenge the naïve assumption is 
to say that the objects of perceptual experience seem as if they were mind-
independent, when in fact we have strong reasons –based on the possibility 
of perceptual error– to think that this is not the case. Indeed, the sense-data 
theory may accept that introspection is right about perceptual experience 
being transparent* to something, insisting at the same time that a priori 
–without considering causal or empirical considerations about perceptual 
error or the way our experiences are brought about– introspection doesn’t 
tell us anything conclusive about the ontology of what our experiences are 
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transparent* to. Sense-data theorists should accept that the Transparency* 
Thesis does not entail either the falsity or the truth of the Transparency 
Thesis. The same is valid for those who want to reject the sense-data theory 
appealing only to introspective considerations.
The possibility of perfectly matching hallucinations plays an important 
role at the moment of undermining what follows a priori from introspection. 
Perfectly matching hallucinations are ex hypothesis, experiences that we 
cannot tell apart from veridical perceptions. The fact that hallucinations are 
phenomenally indistinguishable from genuine perceptions is of course an 
epistemic fact about what we can or cannot tell on the basis of introspection. 
As in many other issues in philosophy and psychology, sometimes epistemic 
claims regarding what we can know on the basis of our introspective 
cognitive abilities alone are insuffi cient for deciding the ontology of a 
particular mental state/event or the ontology of the objects and properties 
that are consciously present during those states/events. 
Imagine that a particular subject –John– undergoes a psychological 
experiment in which he is presented with a red apple and he is constantly 
asked to report how things are with him introspectively. However, the 
scientist who conducts the experiment has not informed John that every 5 
seconds, his experience will be manipulated in the following way: A machine 
capable of producing a perfectly matching hallucination as of a red apple 
in front of John will be turned on. The intervention will last 10 seconds 
and then the scientist will switch off the device, leaving John in perceptual 
contact with the actual red apple located in his environment. Let’s assume 
that John (sometimes during the intervention and sometimes not) always 
reports the same: “It looks to me as if there is a red apple” or simply “That 
is a red apple”. Firstly, it is clear that during the hallucinatory instances 
John cannot tell solely by introspection that he is presented with what we 
might call a “mind-dependent” red apple. Secondly, John cannot detect 
the transitions between hallucinatory and perceptual episodes. Therefore, 
he cannot tell merely by introspection that sometimes he is immediately 
presented with a mind-independent red apple and other times with a mind-
dependent apple or sense-data. 
The possibility of thought-experiments of this kind suggest that 
transparency, understood as the denial of sense-data subjectivism and the 
acceptance of the alleged mind-independence of perceptual objects, is 
something which is not introspectively obvious, something that we cannot 
decide from the armchair. Unlike the Transparency* Thesis, the Transparency 
Thesis is not something that we can settle solely on the basis of introspective 
refl ection. Introspection alone is neutral regarding the ultimate ontological 
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nature of the objects of perceptual experience. Introspectively speaking, the 
sense-data theory is in no better position than any other theory, including 
those theories that actually deny the existence of non-physical entities. If you 
want to attack the sense-data theory or establish the truth of a rival account 
you should consider the epistemological and ontological features that we 
previously discussed in this paper and remain skeptical about what can be 
established about the nature of the immediate objects of visual experience 
just introspectively. 
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